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Schiro v. Farley: If at First You Don't

Succeed, Trial and Trial Again; The Demise
of the Double Jeopardy Clause Within the
Context of Capital Punishment
INTRODUCTION

In light of society's distress over crime and its desire for retribution,
the death penalty has been at the forefront of the political arena for years.
Many politicians, including judges, declare their support of the death penalty
to prove they are "tough on crime." They fear committing political suicide
from appearing to oppose it.' Under this cloud of the public's desire for
speedy retribution, the United States Supreme Court has shown a willingness
2
to limit death row candidates' capabilities to prevent their own executions.
3
This casenote analyzes the Schiro v. Farley decision. In Schiro, the
jury had a choice of returning guilty verdicts on any of the following three
counts of murder: (1) knowingly or "intentionally"killing; (2) killing while
committing rape; and (3) killing while committing criminal deviate

1. See Ronald J. Tabak, Politics and the Dedth Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and
Due Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 293-94
(1994).
2. See id. at 242-46. For example, the Court has held that new constitutional rules
would not apply retroactively on collateral review unless one of two narrow exceptions apply:
(1) it makes the conduct non-criminal, or (2) it is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
Id. at 245 (referring to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)). Also, with the abuse of
writ doctrine, courts can avoid reaching merits of a constitutional claim because a defendant
initially failed to raise the claim in state court. Id. at 245 (referring to Sawyer v. Whitley,
505 U.S. 333, 337-38 (1992)). Moreover, the Supreme Court recently changed the burden
of proof in habeas cases. Previously, when a defendant succeeded in demonstrating a
constitutional error, the burden was on the prosecutor to show that it was harmless. Now,
even though a defendant establishes there was constitutional error, the defendant has the
burden to prove the error was prejudicial. Id. at 245-46 (referring to Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619 (1993)).
3. 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994). A brief overview of the facts surrounding Schiro is
necessary to provide the requisite framework and an understanding of the issues this note
analyzes.
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conduct.4 The jury returned a verdict on the killing while committing rape
count and was silent as to the rest. 5 To impose the death penalty in the
state of Indiana, the state has to establish at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.6 In Schiro, the relevant aggravating
circumstance was that the defendant "intentionally"killed the victim while
committing or attempting to commit rape. 7 However, in Indiana, the judge
can override the jury's recommendation and impose the death sentence if he
or she finds beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one aggravating
circumstance existed.8 In the sentencing phase, the jury recommended
against imposing the death penalty and instead voted for life imprisonment.9
Using this "intentionally"killed element of which the jury was silent in the
guilt or innocence phase, the judge overrode the jury's recommendation and
found that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Schiro "intentionally" killed the victim while committing or attempting to commit rape and
sentenced Schiro to death. 10 The Supreme Court of the United States held
that a judge's use of elements such as "intentional"in the sentencing phase
of which the jury was silent in the guilt or innocence phase, does not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause."
It is important to understand that neither this casenote nor the case it
examines challenges the constitutionality of the death penalty in general, nor
Indiana's death-penalty statute. Although the death penalty itself contains
many important constitutional issues, the scope of the death penalty issues
in this note are limited to its effect on double jeopardy protections. This
note argues that allowing a judge to use elements in the sentencing phase to
impose the death penalty, with elements that the jury was silent in the guilt
or innocence phase, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. 2 Part I reviews
the policy reasons behind the Double Jeopardy Clause. Part II presents the
facts and background of the case and addresses the United States Supreme
Court's opinion. Part III analyzes the opinion. Part IV contemplates the
impact of treating capital cases as two trials only when there is a remand
4. See infra note 115 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
5. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 119 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
8. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 122 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
11. See Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 786 (1994) (holding that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not require the Court to vacate the death sentence imposed on Thomas Schiro)
(emphasis added).
12. For a general discussion of the treatment and politics of the death penalty, see
Tabak, supra note 1.
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after appeal. Finally, the conclusion expresses the author's concern that the
Schiro decision will further erode the protections of the Double Jeopardy
Clause as a side effect of society's desire for retribution.
I. FIFTH AMENDMENT--THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
The Double Jeopardy Clause contained in the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution13 represents a balance of a defendant's interest
in finality versus the state's interest in "insuring that the guilty are
punished."' 4
The underlying idea [of the Double Jeopardy Clause], one that is
deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in
a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty."'
Thus, the United States Supreme Court has stated that pursuant to this
philosophy, it is well settled that under the Fifth Amendment, "a verdict of
acquittal is final, ending a defendant's jeopardy, and even when 'not
followed by any judgment, is a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same
13. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause was held
applicable to States via the Fourteenth Amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784.
794 (1969) (stating that prohibitions against double jeopardy "represents a fundamental ideal
in our constitutional heritage"). Benton overruled Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
14. E.g., Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on
Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1033-36 (1980).
Although it is arguable that a defendant may have less of a finality interest in the sentence
determination than in the determination of guilt or innocence, this argument is not as strong
in death penalty cases because the severity and irrevocability of the death penalty increases
the importance of the defendant's interest in sentence finality, especially when first sentenced
to life over death. Compare Westen, 78 MICH. L. REV. at 1051 (asserting that defendants
generally have less finality interest in determination of sentence than in determination of guilt
or innocence) with Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (holding that capital cases
constitute two trials because the capital sentencing proceeding "was itself a trial on the issue
of punishment," see infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text) and Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447, 468-69 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that the death
penalty differs from other forms of punishment because of its severity and irrevocability).
15. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); see also United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (citing Green).
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The purpose of this casenote is not to describe the entire

history or applications of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 7 although it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the foundation upon which the Schiro decision is based.
A. APPLICATION OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY PRINCIPLES TO SENTENCING
PROCEDURES

Although the Double Jeopardy Clause has been extensively applied to bar
multiple prosecutions or punishments, its application in the sentencing phase
is not as developed."8 The Double Jeopardy Clause embodies several specific
protections. "It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense."' 9 However, the Court has been hesitant to extend similar principles
to sentencing procedures.2" Recognizing precedent, the United States
Supreme Court ruled in Bullington v. Missouri that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not absolutely prohibit the imposition of a harsher sentence at
retrial."
22
the Court held that the Double Jeopardy
In North Carolinav. Pearce,
Clause does not bar imposition of a more severe sentence upon reconviction
of defendant who had the original conviction set aside at defendant's initiative,

16. Green, 355 U.S. at 188 (stating the well-settled principle set forth in United States
v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896)).
17. For a complete treatment of the Double Jeopardy Clause, see Wayne R. LaFave
& Jerold H. Israel, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, ch. 24 (1985); John E. Theuman, Annotation,
Supreme Court's Views as to Application, in State CriminalProsecutionsof Double Jeopardy
Clause of Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment, 95 L. Ed. 2d 924 (1993); Ernest H.
Schopler, Annotation, Supreme Court's Views of FifthAmendment' s Double Jeopardy Clause
Pertinent to or Applied in Federal Criminal Cases, 50 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1993); see also
Bradley E. Kotler et al., Double Jeopardy, 82 GEO. L.J. 962 (1994); William S. McAninch,
Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 411 (1993).
18. It is well established that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids retrying a defendant
who had previously been acquitted of the crime charged. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S.
430, 437 (1981); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129-30 (1980); Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571
(1977); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 192 (1957).
19. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); see also Note, Twice in
Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 265-66 (1965) (setting forth the three specific protections).
20. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 438.
21. Id.; See infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text (discussing Bullington decision).
22. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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as long as the more severe sentence was not vindictive against the defendant
for procuring the set aside of the original conviction.23 The Supreme Court
in Pearceconcluded that "[i]n order to assure the absence of such [vindictiveness] .... whenever ajudge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant
after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. ,24
However, in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, the Supreme Court refused to extend the
Pearce requirements to juries who sentence defendants.2 5
2 6 the Court did not
In United States v. DiFrancesco,
find a Double
Jeopardy problem with a provision of the Organized Crime Control Act of
197027 granting the government a limited right to obtain a harsher sentence

on appeal of the original sentence. 2'

Furthermore, in Stroud v. United

23. Id. at 723-24. In Pearce, the defendant was convicted in state court for assault
with intent to commit rape and was sentenced to prison for 12 to 15 years. Several years
later he initiated post-conviction proceedings that affected the reversal of his conviction on
the ground that an involuntary confession had been used as evidence against him in violation
of his privilege against self-incrimination. After reversal, he was retried, convicted, and
sentenced to a term of eight years in addition to the time already served. Therefore, he
originally received a sentence that would have permitted him to be released on parole after
12 years. However, the parties agreed that the new sentence after reconviction amounted to
a longer total sentence than his original sentence. Id. at 713-14; see also Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 23-24 (1973) (reaffirming Pearce).
24. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
25. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 18 (1973). In the first trial, the jury
sentenced the defendant to 15 years in prison for robbery by open force or violence.
Defendant won a new trial after a successful appeal. Id. at 19. Upon retrial that was similar
in most respects but with a different judge and a new jury, the defendant was again
convicted. However, this time he was sentenced to life imprisonment. To distinguish
Chaffin from Pearce, the Supreme Court observed: "Normally, there would be no way for
a jury to place on the record the reasons for its collective sentencing determination, and
ordinarily the resentencing jury would not be informed of any conduct of the accused unless
relevant to the question of guilt." Id. at 28 n.15; see also Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S.
430, 440, n.13 (1981) (discussing Chaffin).
26. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3576. This statute grants the United States the right to appeal the
sentence imposed upon a "dangerous special offender," under specified conditions. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3575 (describing when prosecutors can seek an "increased sentence for dangerous special
offenders").
28. 449 U.S. at 137-38. In DiFrancesco, the defendant was convicted of the
following: (1) damaging federal property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361; (2) unlawfully
storing explosive materials in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 8420); and (3) conspiring to commit
these offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Id. at 122. The defendant was originally
sentenced to eight years for (1), one year for (2), and five years for (3). However, under the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, the government appealed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3576 and DiFrancesco's sentence was increased to two 10-year terms on federal racketeering
counts as a "dangerous special offender" as defined by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575(e) and (f).
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States,29 the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit
the imposition of the death penalty in a subsequent trial, when in the
previous trial the jury added words "without capital punishment" to the
verdict.3 ° However, it is important to note that the sentencing procedures
in Pearce,DiFrancesco, Chaffin, and Stroud did not have the "hallmarks"
of the trial on guilt or innocence.3" In these cases, the prosecution was not
required to prove facts beyond a reasonable doubt or additional facts in
order to justify a harsher sentence.32 There were no separate sentencing
proceedings in Pearce, Chaffin, and Stroud.33 Although in DiFrancesco
there was a separate sentencing proceeding, the appellate review of the
sentence was "on the record of the sentencing court" and -not a de novo
proceeding that would give the government a new opportunity to convince
a subsequent factfinder of its view of the facts.' Also, the state statute did35
not limit the jury to only two choices: death or life imprisonment.
Instead, under DiFrancesco,if the federal government proves the convicted
defendant is a dangerous special offender, the judge may sentence that
person to "an appropriate term not to exceed twenty-five years and not
to the maximum term otherwise authorized by
disproportionate in severity
36
law for such felony."
Nevertheless, in capital sentencing cases, the Court recognized a narrow
exception to the general principle that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
absolutely prohibit the imposition of a harsher sentence at retrial.37 The
Court's reason for the narrow exception is because in capital cases, the
sentencing procedure differs significantly from the sentencing procedures
employed in other cases where the Double Jeopardy Clause has been held
not applicable. a

29. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
30. ld.

31. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 439 (1981).

32. Id. at 439.
33. Id. Pearce, Chaffin, and Stroud were not similar to capital cases where there are
two separate proceedings: (1) guilt or innocence phase, and (2) sentencing phase.

34. Id. at 440. In the sentencing phase of a capital case, the government does have

an opportunity to convince a subsequent factfinder of its views of the facts to prove
aggravating circumstances.
35. Id. The state statute is distinguished from capital cases where the jury is given
only two choices: death or life imprisonment. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
36. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 441.

37. Id. at 438.

38. Id.
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B. THE BULLINGTON V. MISSOURI DECISION

Bullington was comprised of an original jury trial on guilt or innocence,
followed by a separate jury determination on sentencing. a9 The jury
convicted the defendant for capital murder.4 A defendant convicted for
capital murder under Missouri law faces only two possible sentences: death,
or life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole for fifty
years.4' The jury at the sentencing hearing returned its sentencing verdict
in favor of life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole for
fifty years. 42 However, the defendant obtained a new trial. 43 The prosecution stated that it intended again to seek the death penalty and the defense
moved to strike. 44
The United States Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars the imposition of the death penalty at a new trial after remand, when
in the first sentencing decision, the jury refused to impose the death penalty
and the prosecution had the burden of proving certain elements beyond a
reasonable doubt before the death penalty could be imposed. 4' The Court
ruled that the government cannot pursue the death penalty in a subsequent
conviction following remand of an earlier capital conviction where the first
jury refused to impose the death penalty. 46 The Court recognized that the
sentencing procedure that resulted in the death sentence in Bullington
differed significantly from the sentencing procedures used in any of the
Court's cases where the Double Jeopardy Clause had been held not
applicable to sentencing.47
39. Id. at 435.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 432; Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.008.1 (1978).
42. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 435-36. Unlike in Schiro, the trial judge in Bullington did
not have the same authority to override the jury's recommendation and impose the death
penalty.
43. Id. at 436. The defendant was granted a new trial because the United States
Supreme Court, in another case, struck down Missouri law that allowed women to claim
automatic exemption from jury service. Id. (referring to Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357
(1979)).
44. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 436.
45. Id. at 431-32. In Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 40 (1919), the Court held
that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the imposition of the death penalty at a new
trial, even though the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment in the first sentencing
hearing. Unlike Bullington, however, in Stroud, the prosecution was not required to prove
elements beyond a reasonable doubt in the sentencing hearing.
46. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 431.
47. Id. at 438; see supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text (regarding cases in which
the Supreme Court has held the Double Jeopardy Clause was inapplicable to sentencing).
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In Bullington, the jury was not given unbounded discretion regarding
punishment.4 Instead, there was a separate hearing required and held,
where the jury was presented a choice between two alternatives 49 and given
standards to guide their sentencing decision.' Also, the prosecution had
a higher burden than merely recommending what it felt to be an appropriate
punishment.5 The prosecution had the "burden of establishing certain
facts beyond a reasonable doubt" to obtain the harsher penalty of death over
life imprisonment.5 2 The sentencing hearing "resembled and, indeed, in all
relevant respects was like the immediately proceeding trial on the issue of
sentencing proceeding "was itself a trial
guilt or innocence. 5 3 The capital
54
punishment.
of
on the issue
In Arizona v. Rumsey,55 the Court's seven-justice majority reaffirmed
Bullington's five-to-four decision. 6 Pursuant to Bullington, in Rumsey, the
Court concluded that although the initial sentence of life imprisonment was
based on the trial judge's legal error of state law, the implied rejection of
the death penalty prevents the state from again trying to impose the death
penalty. 7 The Court stated, "the fact that 'the acquittal may result from
erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
Bullington, 451 U.S. at 438.
Id.

52. Id.

53. Id.
54. Id. For further discussion see McAninch, supra note 17, at 487-89 (1993). Cf.
John A. Chatzky, Extending Double Jeopardy Protections to Sentencing: Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127 (1982) (agreeing with Powell's

dissent in Bullington, criticizing the majority's disregard of precedential case law that

distinguished between the determination of guilt stage and the sentencing stage of trial,
asserting that the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are inapplicable to sentencing
decisions). In his dissent, Powell argued that the sentencer's function is not to discover facts,
but to "mete out just desserts as he sees them." Bullington, 451 U.S. at 450 (Powell, J.,

dissenting). Generally, that is true. However, in capital cases, facts are to be established

beyond a reasonable doubt in order to impose the death sentence. See supra note 52 and

accompanying text.

55. 467 U.S. 203 (1984).
56. Id. at 205.
57. Id. at 207. The trial judge specifically noted that the "killing for pecuniary gain"
aggravating circumstance was inapplicable because it was limited to contract killings. The

State Supreme Court reversed and remanded holding that the trial judge had misinterpreted
the statutory provision regarding the aggravating circumstance "killing for pecuniary gain."
In the second sentencing proceeding, the judge found "killing for pecuniary gain" as an
aggravating circumstance and sentenced the defendant to death. Id. at 205-08.
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principles' ... affects the accuracy of the determination, but it does not alter
its essential character."'8
The Supreme Court has allowed the death sentence to be imposed in
a subsequent sentencing proceeding, however, when the death penalty was
imposed in the first sentencing proceeding. In Hitchcock v. Dugger,59 the
Supreme Court held that when in the first sentencing proceeding the
defendant is sentenced to death, even if based on the judge's substantial
error, the death penalty may be imposed in the subsequent sentencing
hearing after reversal and remand.'
Also, in Poland v. Arizona,6' the
Supreme Court held that when the trial court imposes the death sentence
based on an aggravating circumstance that the appellate court found
insufficient evidence to support that aggravating circumstance, the Double
Jeopardy Clause did not foreclose imposition of the death penalty in a
subsequent sentencing proceeding.6 2
However, the Court had not considered the effects on the collateral
estoppel doctrine and the implied acquittal doctrine from treating capital
cases in essence as two separate trials: (1) the guilt or innocence phase; and
(2) the sentencing phase.

58. Id. at 211 (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 (1978)).
59. 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
60. Id. at 398-99. In Hitchcock, the judge improperly refused to consider mitigating
evidence that was not listed in the state's capital murder statute. The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the sentence, but noted that on remand the death penalty could be
imposed. Id.; see also McAninch, supra note 17, at 488 (discussing Hitchcock).
61. 476 U.S. 147 (1986).
62. Id. at 156-57. In Poland, similar to Rumsey, the judge in the first sentencing
proceeding concluded that the aggravating factor of "a killing for pecuniary gain" was
applicable only to contract killings. Instead, the judge used the "especially heinous, cruel,
or depraved" aggravating circumstance to impose the death penalty. The state supreme court
reversed and remanded because: (1) the conviction was based on jury's tainted verdict; and
(2) the evidence was insufficient to support that aggravating circumstance and noted that the
"killing for pecuniary gain" aggravating circumstance is not limited to contract killings. In
the second sentencing proceeding, the defendant was again convicted and the judge used all
of the following aggravating circumstances to sentence the defendant to death: "pecuniary
gain;" "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved;" and "previous conviction of 'a felony ...
involving . . . violence on another person."' The state supreme court again found the
evidence insufficient to support the "especially heinous" aggravating circumstance, but
sufficient to support the other two. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge's rejection
of the "pecuniary gain" aggravating circumstance did not act as an acquittal of that
circumstance. Also, the Supreme Court held that the State Supreme Court's finding of
insufficiency of evidence to support the "especially heinous" aggravating circumstance did
not act as an acquittal because the reviewing court did not find the evidence legally
insufficient to justify imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 149-50.
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C. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

An important issue that had not been specifically addressed within the
context of death penalty cases constituting two trials, is whether the doctrine
of collateral estoppel precludes issues litigated in the guilt or innocence
phase from being relitigated in the sentencing phase. 63 The United States
Supreme Court held in Ashe v. Swenson6 that the Double Jeopardy Clause
includes the doctrine of collateral estoppel (i.e., issue preclusion). 65 This
doctrine means that an issue cannot be litigated again between the same
parties when that issue has previously been determined by a valid and final
judgment.' In Ashe, the State charged four defendants with armed robbery
of six poker players.67 The state tried Ashe for robbing one of the
victims.

68

However, the prosecution had weak evidence to establish that

Ashe was one of the robbers. 69 Thus, the identity of Ashe as one of the
robbers was the major issue at trial. The judge instructed the jury to find
the defendant guilty if it found that Ashe was one of the participants in the
armed robbery. 7' The jury found the petitioner not guilty due to insufficient evidence. 7 2 However, the judge did not instruct the jury to elaborate
7
upon its verdict.
63. For a general discussion of the collateral estoppel doctrine in the criminal context,
see Anne Bowen Poulin, Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases: Reuse of Evidence After
Acquittal, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1989); Cynthia L. Randall, Acquittals in Jeopardy: Criminal
Collateral Estoppel and the Use of Acquitted Act Evidence, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 283 (1992).
If the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes issues litigated in the guilt or innocence phase
from being relitigated in the sentencing phase, then the question becomes whether the issue,
for example intent, was litigated and actually resolved in the guilt or innocence phase. See
infra note 79 and accompanying text.
64. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
65. Id. at 442. The Double Jeopardy Clause generally aims to protect the individual
criminal defendant from being forced to relitigate alleged criminal actions the defendant was
acquitted. In contrast, the collateral estoppel doctrine is intended to promote broader goals
such as efficiency, fairness, and truth determination. See Randall, supra note 63, at 290-91.
66. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443.
67. Id. at 438.
68. Id.
69. Id. "Two of the witnesses thought that there had been only three robbers
altogether, and could not identify [Ashe] as one of them. Another of the victims, who was
[Ashe's] uncle by marriage, said that at the 'patrol station' he had positively identified each
of the other three men accused of the holdup, but could say only that [Ashe's] voice
'sounded very much like' that of one of the robbers. The fourth participant in the poker
game did identify [Ashe], but only by his 'size and height, and his actions."' Id.
70. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 439.
71. Id.
72. Id.

1995]

SCHIRO V. FARLEY: TRIAL AND TRIAL AGAIN

After being acquitted of robbing one victim, the state again tried Ashe
for robbing another victim of the same event." However, in the second
trial, the state had substantially stronger testimony on the issue of Ashe's
identity.74 Unlike the first trial, but with virtually identical jury instructions, the jury found Ashe guilty.7 5 The United States Supreme Court held
that the issue of the defendant's identity as one of the robbers had been
determined in the first trial. 6 Thus, the theory of collateral estoppel
precluded the issue from being relitigated in the second trial.
The collateral estoppel analysis is not to be applied with a "hypertechnical" approach, but with "realism and rationality. 7 8 The defendant has
the burden to demonstrate that the issue he seeks to foreclose from
relitigation was actually decided in a previous proceeding.7 9 When the
acquittal from a previous judgment was based upon a general verdict, the
court must "examine that record of a prior proceeding, taking into account
the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matters, and conclude
whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other
than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. "'0
The examination "must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye
to all the circumstances of the proceedings."' "Any test more technically
restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of
collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings at least in every case where the
first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal. 8 2
In a more recent decision applying the collateral estoppel analysis,
Dowling v. United States, 3 the Supreme Court came to a different
conclusion than in Ashe. Dowling was convicted of robbing a bank with a
73. Id.
74. Id. Two of the witnesses, who at the first trial were unable to identify Ashe as one
of the robbers, "now testified that [Ashe's] features, size, and mannerisms matched those of
one of their assailants. Likewise, the victim who before had identified Ashe only by his size
and actions now remembered Ashe by the "unusual sound of his voice." Furthermore, the
State declined to call one of the victims whose identification testimony at the first trial had
been adverse to the prosecution. Id.
75. Id. at 441.
76. Id. at 446.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 441.
79. E.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1990) (stating that "The
" and that the
Courts of Appeals have unanimously placed the burden on the defendant ....
Court could "see no reason to depart from the majority rule .....
80. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. (citing Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948)).
82. Id.
83. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
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small gun while wearing a ski mask.8 Pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Evidence 404(b),85 at trial, testimony of Ms. Vena Henry was introduced. 6 She testified that approximately two weeks after the bank
robbery, the defendant had attempted to rob her house using a small
handgun and wearing a mask." The judge allowed the evidence introduced even though Dowling had been acquitted for the attempted robbery
of Ms. Henry. 8 The government stated two purposes for introducing the
testimony: (1) to strengthen identification of Dowling as one of the robbers
of the bank; and (2) to link Dowling with a co-defendant who was identified
at the scene of both crimes.8 9 The United States Supreme Court concluded
that the government was not collaterally estopped from using Ms. Henry's
testimony in the bank robbery trial. 9° The Court reasoned that because
there were any number of possible reasons the jury acquitted Dowling, the
defendant had failed to prove that he was not one of the intruders. 9'
D. IMPLIED ACQUITTAL

An equally important issue, that had not been specifically addressed
within the context of death penalty cases constituting two trials, is whether
the jury's silence on the greater offenses in the guilt or innocence phase acts
as an implied acquittal of the elements from the greater offense, thus
preventing the state from reprosecuting those elements at the sentencing
phase.
Courts continuously refer to Green v. United States92 to explain
implied acquittals. In Green, the jury found that the defendant was guilty
of second degree murder, but was silent on the charge of murder in the first
degree. 93 The defendant appealed his conviction and the United States

84. Id. at 344.
85. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) prohibits the use of evidence of other "crimes,
wrongs, or acts" to show bad character, however, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) allows
such evidence for other purposes, such as to show identity or intent. FED R. EVID. 404(a)
& (b).
86. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 344-45.

87. Id.
88. Id. at 345.
89. Id. at 344-45.
90. Id. at 348-49.
91. Id. at 352. See generally Randall, supra note 63, at 296-301 (criticizing Dowling
for failing to protect double jeopardy interests and for insisting on strict application of the
collateral estoppel doctrine).
92. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
93. Id. at 186.
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Court of Appeals reversed. 94 On remand, the state reprosecuted the
defendant again for first degree murder and this time he was convicted and
9
sentenced to death.95 The United States Supreme Court held in Green,
where a jury was authorized at first trial to find a defendant guilty of either
a greater or lesser included offense, and the jury found defendant guilty of
the lesser included offense but was silent on the greater, the state cannot
reprosecute the defendant for the greater offense because the jury has
97
impliedly acquitted the defendant of the greater offense.
The Green opinion suggests that the Court's conclusion was based not
on the jury having found the defendant guilty on the lesser included
charge, 9 but instead on the dismissal of the jury without it returning a
verdict on the greater included charge and "no extraordinary circumstances
appeared which prevented [the jury from reaching a verdict]." 99 Double
Jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn. 1 ° Thus, because the Court in
Green dismissed the jury without it having convicted the defendant of the
greater included offense, Double Jeopardy precluded the state from
reprosecuting the defendant for the greater included offense of first degree
murder. 1l

II. SCHIRO

1

V. FARLEY '

2

A. CASE FACTS

The Court found that Thomas Schiro obtained entry into the house of
3 Once
Laura Luebbehusen by telling her that his car had broken down.
Schiro entered the house, he exposed himself to her." She informed him
94. Id. The state court of appeals reversed and remanded because it held that the
conviction was not supported by evidence.
95. Id.
96. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
97. Id. at 190-92.
98. McAninch, supra note 17, at 429 (alluding to Green, 355 U.S. at 190 n.ll).
99. Id. at 430; see also Green, 355 U.S. at 190 n. II (stating "[iut should be noted that
Green's claim of former jeopardy is not based on his previous conviction for second degree
murder but instead on the original jury's refusal to convict him of first degree murder").
100. E.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35-36 (1978) (citing Downum v. United States,
372 U.S. 734 (1963)); see also McAninch, supra note 17, at 418-19 (describing when double
jeopardy attaches).
101. See McAninch, supra note 17, at 429.
102. 114 S.Ct. 783 (1994).
103. Id. at 786.
104. Id.
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that she was a lesbian, that she had been raped as a child, and that she had
never had intercourse since, and did not want to have sex. 0 5 Schiro
proceeded to rape her numerous times.' °6 He raped her again after she
tried to escape. 7 Schiro then tried to kill her out of fear that she would
turn him in to the police.1' 8 He used a vodka bottle and beat her on the
head with it until it broke and then proceeded to beat her with an iron."°
When she resisted, he strangled her to death."0 Before Schiro left, he
attempted to destroy evidence linking him to the crime."'
Laura Luebbehusen's car was found near the halfway house where
Schiro lived." 2 Schiro eventually confessed to a counselor that he
committed the murder.'
After Schiro was arrested, he confessed to
another inmate that he had been drinking and taking quaaludes the night of
the killing." 4
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Indiana charged Schiro with three counts of murder: Count I,
"knowingly" killing; Count II, killing while committing the crime of rape;
and Count III, killing while committing criminal deviate conduct." 5
In addition to the murder counts, the jury was given other possible

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. In addition:
"pathologist testified that there were a number of contusions on the
body,
including injuries to the head. The victim also had lacerations on one
nipple and a thigh, and a tear in the vagina, all caused after death. A
forensic dentist determined that the thigh injury was caused by a human
bite. The cause of death was strangulation."

111. Id.
112. id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 787 (referring to IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (Supp. 1978); At the
time of the crime, Indiana defined murder as follows: "A person who: (1) knowingly or
intentionally kills another human being; or (2) kills another human being while committing
or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct,
kidnapping, rape or robbery; commits murder, a felony." (emphasis added)).
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verdicts." 6 The jury returned a verdict of guilty on Count II, killing while
committing the crime of rape, but was silent as to the remaining counts." 7
For Indiana to sentence Schiro to death, the prosecution was required
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one
aggravating factor." 8 The relevant aggravating factor in this case was
that: "[T]he defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the
victim while committing or attempting to commit . . . rape."" 9 The jury
returned a verdict recommending against the death penalty and instead called
However, in Indiana, the trial judge makes "the
for life imprisonment."
final determination of the sentence, after considering the jury's recommendation.' 2' Rejecting the jury's recommendation, the trial judge found that
the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that "[t]he defendant

116. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 787 (including lesser included offenses of voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter, guilty but mentally ill, not guilty by reason of insanity, and not
guilty).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 787 (citing IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(b) (Supp. 1978)). The aggravating
circumstances under current Indiana law include: (1) intentionally killing while committing
or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct,
kidnapping, rape, robbery, or dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug; (2) murdering by
unlawful detonation of an explosive with intent to injure person or damage property; (3)
murder by lying in wait; (4) defendant was hired to kill; (5) defendant hired another person
to kill; (6) victim was a corrections employee, fireman, judge, or law enforcement officer
acting in course of duty or defendant motivated by an act victim performed while acting in
the course of duty; (7) defendant has been convicted of another murder; (8) defendant has
committed another murder, at any time, regardless of whether convicted of that murder; (9)
defendant was in jail, on probation or parole; (10) defendant dismembered the victim; (11)
victim under age twelve; (12) victim was victim of other offenses for which the defendant
was convicted. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(b) (Supp. 1990).
119. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 787 (referring to IND. CODE § 50-2-9(b)(1) (Supp. 1978))
(emphasis added).
120. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 787.
121. The Indiana Death Sentence statute provides:
If the hearing is by jury, the jury shall recommend to the court whether the
death penalty should be imposed. The jury may recommend the death
penalty only if it finds: (1) that the state has proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that at least one of the aggravating circumstances exists; and or life
imprisonment without parole, or neither should be imposed; and (2) that
any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating
circumstance or circumstances. The court shall make the final determination of the sentence, after considering the jury's recommendation, and the
sentence shall be based on the same standards that the jury was required to
consider. The court is not bound by the jury's recommendation.
IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) (Supp. 1990).
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committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing
22
or attempting to commit ... rape," and sentenced Schiro to death.
The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal.12 The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.' 24 Next, Schiro attempted to seek
post-conviction relief in state court. 25 The Indiana Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court for a second time." 6 The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari a second time. 27 Subsequently,
Schiro filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. 28 The District Court
remanded the case to the Indiana courts for exhaustion of state remedies.' 29 For the third time, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction sentence. 30 The Indiana Supreme Court rejected Schiro's
argument that the jury's failure to convict him on the "knowingly" or
"intentionally" murdering count, operated as an acquittal of intentional
murder; thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit the use of the
intentional murder as an aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes.'
The Indiana Supreme Court held that, "'[felony murder] is not an
included offense of [murder] and where the jury, as in the instant case, finds
the defendant guilty of one of the types of murder and remains silent on the
other, it does not operate as an acquittal of the elements of the type of
' 32
murder the jury chose not to consider. "

122. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 787 (emphasis added).
123. Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1047 (Ind.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983)
(upholding Indiana's death penalty statute and its application). It is interesting to note that
before the Indiana Supreme Court's decision, it remanded this cause and ordered the trial
court to comply fully with the state's death penalty statute because the judge had not
sufficiently articulated his reasons for imposing the death sentence. Instead, the trial judge
mistakenly listed as aggravating circumstances his counter-arguments to any possible
mitigating circumstances available to defendant. Id. at 1057. It was not until after this
remand that the judge found that Schiro intentionally killed. Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct.
783, 794 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Schiro v. Indiana. 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
125. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 787.
126. Schiro v. State, 479 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1036 (1986).
127. Schiro v. Indiana, 475 U.S. 1036 (1986).
128. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 788.
129. Id.
130. Schiro v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 910 (1989).
131. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 788 (emphasis added).
132. Id. (quoting Schiro v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
910 (1989)).
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The federal district court then denied the federal habeas petition.'33
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."3' The United States
Supreme Court ,granted certiorari' 35 to decide whether relying on the
intentional murder aggravating circumstance violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 36 It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court did
not address the constitutionality of Indiana's Death Sentence statute that
allows the judge to impose a death sentence overriding a jury's recommendation of life. In Spaziano v. Florida,137 the Supreme Court held that the
practice of judicial override is constitutional, even over a jury's recommendation of life. 3 ' This casenote does not address the constitutionality of
the judicial override to impose death in general. However, this casenote
does challenge the judge's use of elements in the sentencing phase of which
the jury was silent in the guilt or innocence phase to impose the death
penalty. 3 9
C. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

Schiro's first argument was that the state could not sentence him to
death based on the intentional murder aggravating circumstances because the
sentencing proceeding amounted to a second prosecution for intentional
murder in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.' 4° The Court restated
the several protections the Double Jeopardy Clause embraces: it protects
133. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 788 (citing Schiro v. Clark, 754 F. Supp. 646 (N.D. Ind.
1990), affd, 963 F.2d 962 (1992), afid, Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994)).
134. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 788 (citing Schiro v. Clark, 963 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1992),
aft'd, Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994)) (accepting the Indiana Supreme Court's
conclusion that the jury verdict was not an acquittal on Count I "knowingly or intentionally"
murder, and that the use of the intentional murder aggravating circumstance did not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause).
135. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 788 (citing Schiro v. Farley, 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993)).
136. Id. (citing Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 788 (1994)). The State raised the
argument that if the Court granted relief to Schiro, that would require retroactive application
of a new rule, thus, violating the principle announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989) (plurality). The Court rejected the argument because the State failed to argue Teague
in both the lower courts and in its brief in opposition to the petition for writ of certiorari.
114 S. Ct. at 788-89.
137. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
138. Id. at 467.
139. See Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 796 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the Court
has upheld such judicial override statutes, but that an "egregious violation of the collateral
estoppel principles embedded in the Double Jeopardy Clause occurs if the judge can base a
capital sentence on a factual predicate that the jury has rejected," as what happened here).
140. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 789.
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against second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction,
and protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. 4' The
Court recognized "that the primary evil to be guarded against is successive
prosecutions: '[Tihe prohibition against multiple trials is the controlling
' 42
constitutional principle. 0
However, the Court refused to treat the first sentencing hearing as a
successive prosecution because that would be inconsistent with its prior
decisions. 43 The Court noted it previously held in Stroud v. United
States,' 4 that a defendant could be resentenced after retrial when a
defendant's conviction was overturned on appeal. 145 The Court has also
held, in Lockhart v. Nelson,'4 that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
bar retrial when the reviewing court finds that a defendant's conviction must
be reversed because evidence was erroneously admitted against him, and
without that evidence, there was insufficient evidence to convict the
defendant. 147 The Court further reasoned that, "[i]f a second sentencing

141. Id. (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,717 (1969) (footnotes omitted)).
The Court also stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause operates as a "bar against repeated
attempts to convict, with consequent subjection of the defendant to embarrassment, expense,
anxiety, and insecurity, and the possibility that he may be found guilty even though
innocent." United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980). And that the "Clause
guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict
[defendant]" when he has been acquitted. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975).
However, the Court stated that where there is "no threat of either multiple punishment or
successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended. Id. at 344.
142. Schiro, 114 S.Ct. at 789 (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132
(1980) (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430
U.S. 564, 569 (1977).
143. Schiro, 114 S.Ct. at 789. If the Court had treated the first sentencing hearing as
a second prosecution, the State would have effectively been barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause from attempting to relitigate "intentional" murder as an aggravating circumstance.
144. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
145. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 789 (discussing Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 17-18

(1919)).

146. 488 U.S. 33 (1988).
147. Id. at 40. The defendant pleaded guilty to a class B felony of burglary. Arkansas
sentenced the defendant under the State's habitual criminal statute. The statute provides that
a defendant convicted of a class B felony can be sentenced to an enhanced term of
imprisonment of 20 to 40 years when the defendant "has previously been convicted of...
[or] found guilty of four [4] or more felonies." However, unbeknownst to prosecutor,
defense attorney, and judge, one of the four convictions relied on as evidence had been
pardoned by the Governor several years after its entry. The Court held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not bar the State from resentencing defendant using another prior
conviction not offered or admitted at the first sentencing hearing. Id. at 34-40.
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clause, we fail
proceeding ordinarily does not violate the double jeopardy
'4

to see how an initial sentencing proceeding could do so.
The Court then stated that it has upheld the enhancement of sentences
using prior convictions, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant in the
sentencing hearing, in essence, must relitigate issues that he was previously
tried. 49 The Double Jeopardy Clause, "'is written in terms of potential or
risk of trial and conviction, not punishment."'150
The Court distinguished this case from Bullington."' Unlike Bullington, the state neither reprosecuted Schiro for intentional murder, nor
submitted him to the death penalty proceeding a second time. 52 Instead,
the Court reasoned that here the state "simply conducted a single sentencing
hearing in the course of a single prosecution.""13'
Contrary to the majority, Justice Blackmun in his dissent argued that
Bullington provides a basis for vacating Schiro's death sentence.'5 He
asserted that Bullington's essential holding was that capital sentencing
proceedings are unique' 5 and can constitute a "jeopardy" under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.'56 The sentencing proceeding had "the hallmarks
of the trial on guilt or innocence,"'5 7 where the prosecution had the burden
to "prov[e] its case" beyond a reasonable doubt.5 8 He argued that the
148. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 789.
149. Id. (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967)).
150. Id. at 790 (citing Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970)).
151. See supra notes 39-54 and accompanying text (describing Bullington).
152. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 790.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 792-93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155. Blackmun asserts that it is "unique" by the very nature of modem capital
sentencing procedures identified in Bullington, 451 U.S. at 442 n.15, because there is a
fundamental principal that death is "different, and that heightened reliability is required at
all stages of the capital trial." Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 793 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
156. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 792 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 793 (citing Bullington, 451 U.S. at 439).
158. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 793 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Bullington, 451 U.S.
at 443). Justice Blackmun quoted Judge DeBruler's dissent from the affirmance of Schiro's
sentence on direct appeal regarding description of a capital sentencing hearing:
[t]he jury reconvenes in court for the sentencing hearing. It is presided
over by the judge. The defendant is present with his counsel and the state
by its trial prosecutor. Evidence is presented in an adversarial setting..
. The burden is upon the state to prove the aggravating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt. The lawyers make final arguments to the jury.
The jury retires to deliberate and returns into open court with its verdict in
the form of a recommendation. This is a full scale jury trial in every sense
of those terms. The defendant must surely feel that he is in "direct peril"
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"trial-like" nature of the capital sentencing hearing and trauma Schiro
underwent in defending against the death sentence are "analogous to [the]
guilt-phase proceedings;" thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause is applica159
ble.
Schiro's second argument was that his death sentence ought to be
vacated based on the principles of constitutional collateral estoppel."6 In
Ashe v. Swenson, 161 the Court held that the double jeopardy clause62
incorporates the doctrine of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings.
Schiro reasoned that when the jury did not return a guilty verdict of
"intentional" murder in Count I, the trial court was precluded from using the
killing
aggravating circumstance of "committing the murder by intentionally
163
rape.'
commit..,
to
attempting
or
committing
while
the victim
The Court had to determine "whether a rational jury could have
grounded its verdict upon an issue other than" intentional killing by
applying collateral estoppel principles."6 The Court found that a rational
jury could have grounded its verdict on an issue other than intentional
killing. 165 The Court analyzed how the jury was not instructed to return
verdicts on all the counts listed" and concluded that because the jury
instructions were not clear and that the jury needed to consider each count
independently, the Court refused to draw any particular conclusion from the
jury's failure to return a verdict on Count 1.167
of receiving the death penalty as he stands to receive the recommendation
of the jury.
Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 793 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting) (citations omitted).

159. Id.

160. Id. at 790. The Court did not address whether collateral estoppel could bar the use
of "intentional" murder as an aggravating circumstance, because, the Court stated, Schiro
failed to meet the burden of establishing that the issue was actually decided previously. Id.
at 790. However, the Court decided that the preclusive effect of the jury's verdict, is a
question of federal law that the Court must review de novo. Id. at 790-91.

161. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
162. Schiro, 114 S.Ct. at 790; see supra note 66 and accompanying text.

163. Schiro, 114 S.Ct. at 790 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 791 (citing the test defined by Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 791-92. Applying collateral estoppel principles, the Court rationalized that
the jury might have believed that it could only return one verdict because in closing
arguments at the guilt phase, the defense counsel told the jury they would "have to go back
there and try to figure out which one of the eight or ten verdicts ... that you will return
back into this Court. Likewise, the prosecution told the jury that "you are only going to be
allowed to return one verdict." The Court further rationalized its holding by suggesting that
the jury possibly could have reached "a guilty verdict on Count II . . . without ever

deliberating on Count I." Id. at 791.
167. Id. at 791.
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The Court further reasoned that the jury instructions were also
ambiguous on the issue of intent to kill.' 68 Although felony murder does
not require intent to kill, 69 the Court found that the jury instructions did
not differentiate between the two ways of proving "murder."'"7 The Court
speculated that the jury may have believed that it had to find that Schiro
"knowing[ly] or intent[ionally]" killed in order to convict on any of the three
murder counts."' Thus, the Court held that in light of the ambiguous
instructions, as a matter of law, "the jury verdict did not necessarily depend
on a finding that Schiro lacked an intent to kill."1 12 Therefore, collateral
estoppel doctrine did not estop the state from using the intent element in the
sentencing hearing.
Justice Stevens in his dissent argued that the jury's verdict was not
ambiguous and that the jurors expressed their conclusion in the only way
they could. 173 Each of the verdict forms had a space to be checked to
record a guilty verdict and the only way to record not guilty was to leave
the space blank. 174 Therefore, by leaving the other forms blank and
checking only one, the jurors rejected those favorable to the defendant, those
favorable to the prosecution (namely Count 1), and concluded that Schiro
Consequently, the jury found Schiro guilty on
was guilty on Count 11.'
Count II, but not guilty on the charges remaining.'
The Court supplied additional evidence in the record that it interpreted
as indicating that "intent" to kill was not a significant issue. 77 The Court
considered the fact that the defense primarily tried to prove Schiro was

168. Id. The Court notes, under Indiana law, a person who either (1) "'knowingly or
intentionally kills ... "'; or (2) "'kills ... while committing or attempting to commit...
rape"' is guilty of "'murder."' IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (Supp. 1978).
169. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 791. The Court stated that "Although the jury was provided with the state
law definition of murder ... the judge also instructed the jury that the State had to prove
intent for both felony and intentional murder: '[t]o sustain the charge of murder, the State
must prove ... [t]hat the defendant engaged in the conduct which caused the death of Laura
Luebbehusen [and] [t]hat when the defendant did so, he knew the conduct would or intended
the conduct to cause the death of Laura Luebbehusen."' Id. (alterations in original).
171. Id. at 792.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 794 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 794-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 795 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For the Court's response to Justice Stevens'
argument, see supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text (regarding the vague jury
instructions failing to instruct the jury to return verdicts on all the counts listed).
177. Id. at 792. The Court provided additional evidence although it stated it was 'not
necessary to [its] conclusion."
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insane, instead of disputing Schiro committed the murder.'78 Also, during
the guilt or innocence phase, neither the defense counsel nor any defense
witnesses asserted that Schiro lacked an intent to kill and should be
acquitted on Count 1.179 Likewise, the Court could not locate in the
transcripts where the defense discussed the issue of Schiro's intent to
kill. " Finally, the Court observed that the jury concluding Schiro
intended to kill is entirely consistent with evidence presented at trial. 8 '
Justice Stevens in his dissent disagreed with the Court's conclusion that
the jury did not necessarily find that Schiro did not intend to kill.' 82 He
acknowledges the significantly gruesome character of the crime and that
these gruesome facts undoubtedly would increase a jury's inclination to
sentence a defendant to death if they believed a defendant had intentionally
killed.'83 However, despite the horror of this crime, these jurors still
unanimously refused to find Schiro guilty of intentional murder and
unanimously concluded that he should not be sentenced to death.'8
Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued that the principal issue was Schiro's
mental condition.'85 No one disputed Schiro killed the victim; however,
intent remained an issue:

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. The Court also asserted that the defense counsel indicated his belief that by
convicting Schiro on Count II, the jury concluded Schiro intended to kill:
The statute ... provides for aggravating circumstances. There is one listed
in this case, and one which you may consider. And that one is that the
murder was committed, was intentionally committed in the commission of
rape and some other things. I assume by your verdict Friday, or Saturday,
that you've probably . . . decided that issue. In finding him guilty of
murder in the commission of a rape, I'm assuming you've decided beyond
a reasonable doubt that it was done in the commission of rape, and so that
aggravating circumstance most likely exists in your mind.
Id. (citing App. to Brief for Respondent 31-32).
181. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 792. The Court stated that Schiro admitted he decided to kill
Laura Luebbehusen after she tried to escape and go to the police, and that "the physical
evidence suggested a deliberate, rather than unintentional, accidental, or even reckless,
killing. The victim was repeatedly beaten with a bottle and an iron; when she resisted she
was strangled to death." Id.
182. Id. at 794 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
184. Id. It is interesting to note that without finding an aggravating circumstance, the
trial judge rejected the jury's recommendation and imposed the death penalty. It was not
until months later, when the State Supreme court remanded the case to give the judge an
opportunity to justify the death sentence that the judge found Schiro intentionally killed
Luebbehusen. Id.
185. Id.
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Five expert witnesses--two employed by the State, one selected by
the court, and two called by the defense--testified at length about
Schiro's unusual personality, his drug and alcohol addiction, and
his history of mental illness. Lay and expert witnesses described
Schiro's bizarre attachment to a mannequin, and other incidents
that lent support to claim of diminished capacity." 6
Stevens asserted that conceivably, the jury might have been persuaded to
find Schiro: (1) not guilty by reason of insanity; or (2) guilty of murder,
voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter but mentally ill.8 7
Instead, the jury was apparently convinced that Schiro did not have the
requisite mental state to support a conviction for intentional murder because
88
of this evidence.1
The Court acknowledged that in some circumstances, jury silence acts
as an implied acquittal 8 9 for Double Jeopardy purposes.'9 However,
the Court reasoned that because the jury's failure to return a verdict does not
have collateral estoppel effect,' 9' it also does not have implied acquittal
effect for the same reasons."

III. ANALYSIS
The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether it
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause to rely on intentional murder as an
aggravating circumstance in a sentencing hearing to impose the death
sentence, when the jury has the authority to return a verdict for intentional
murder offense in the guilt phase, but remains silent on the intentional
element, and instead, returns a verdict for felony murder. 93 Although the
186. Id. (citations omitted).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. For discussion regarding the implied acquittal principal, see supra notes 97-101
and accompanying text.
190. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 792 (referring to Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 19091 (1957) and Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970)).
191. See supra notes 165-172 and accompanying text (reasoning why jury's failure to
return verdict does not have collateral estoppel effect).
192. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 792.
193. Id. at 788.
American Courts have held with uniformity that where a defendant is
charged with two offenses, neither of which is a lesser offense included
within the other, and has been found guilty on one but not on the second
he cannot be tried again on the second even though he secures reversal of
the conviction and even though the two offenses are related offenses
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Schiro Court held that the trial court acted within the boundaries of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court's decision is inconsistent with its
previous decisions regarding the applicability of the Double Jeopardy Clause
to capital cases.
A. INCONSISTENT WITH BULLINGTON V. MISSOURI

The Supreme Court recognized in Bullington v. Missburi'94 that the
sentencing proceeding in capital cases differs significantly from sentencing
The sentencing proceedings are
proceedings in noncapital cases.' 9
distinguishable primarily because unlike noncapital cases, capital cases are
comprised of two trials, both requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) the guilt or innocence phase; and (2) the sentencing phase.' 96 The
Schiro Court recognized the Bullington general principle stating that a
capital sentencing proceeding "[is] itself a trial,"' 97 "requiring a defendant
to submit to a second, identical proceeding[,] tantamount to permitting a
second prosecution of an acquitted defendant."'198 However, in Schiro, the
Court retreats partially from this view asserting that here the "[State] simply
conducted a single sentencing hearing in the course of a single prosecution."199
The Court was correct in the sense that unlike Schiro, Bullington
constituted a subsequent prosecution following reversal and remand.
However, the general principle of Bullington is that capital cases themselves
constitute two trials. 2° It is inconsistent for the Court to then, 20in Schiro,
hold that the state "simply conducted a ...single prosecution." '
The Court uses an artificial means to distinguish Schiro from Bullington, characterizing Schiro as a "single prosecution" merely because there
was no remand from appeal. 2° However, in United States v. DiFrances-

charged in the same indictment.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 194 n.14 (1957) (citing Annotation, 114 A.L.R. 1406);
dissenting) (quoting Green).
see also Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 795 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
194. 451 U.S. 430; see supra notes 39-54 and accompanying text (describing the
Bullington decision).
195. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 438.
196. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
197. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 438.
198. Schiro v. Farley, 114 S.Ct. 783, 790 (1994) (citing Bullington, 451 U.S. at 446).

199. Id.

200. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
201. Schiro, 114 S.Ct. at 790.
202. Id.
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co,2 3 the United States Supreme Court stated: "[tihe exaltation of form
over substance is to be avoided. The Court has said that in the double
jeopardy context it is the substance of the action that is controlling, and-not
4 Therefore, the
the label given that action.'20
question to ask should have
been whether the state could have attempted to reprosecute Schiro for
"intentional" killing in a subsequent guilt-innocence trial. It is well settled
law that the State could not retry the defendant for that offense after the
discharge of the jury.205
However, the Court labels the action of the state in Schiro as "simply
conducting a single sentencing hearing in the course of a single prosecution.'2°6 Nonetheless, the substance of the state action demonstrates
otherwise. The substance of this action was best described by Judge
DeBruler's dissent from the affirmance of Schiro's sentence on direct appeal
regarding description of a capital sentencing hearing:
the jury reconvenes in court for the sentencing hearing. It is
presided over by the judge. The defendant is present with his
counsel and the state by its trial prosecutor. Evidence is presented
in an adversarial setting. . . . The burden is upon the state to
prove the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
The lawyers make final arguments to the jury. The jury retires to
deliberate and returns into open court with its verdict in the form
of a recommendation. This is a full scale jury trial in every sense
of those terms. The defendant must surely feel that he is in
'direct peril' of receiving the death penalty as he stands to receive
the recommendation of the jury.2 °7
203. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
204. Id. at 142; see also Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1047, 1066 (Ind.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1003 (1983) (DeBruler, J., concurring in upholding the conviction and dissenting in
upholding the penalty of death); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,
571 (1977) (stating the court "must determine whether the ruling ..., whatever its label,
actually represents a resolution ....); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975).
205. Schiro v. Farley, 114 S.Ct. 783, 796 (1994) (Stevens, J.,dissenting); see also
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957). The Court in Green stated:
After the original trial, but prior to [defendant's] appeal, it is indisputable
that [defendant] could not have been tried again for first degree murder.
A plea of former jeopardy would have absolutely barred a new prosecution
even though it might have been convincingly demonstrated that the jury
erred in failing to convict him of that offense. And even after appealing
the conviction of second degree murder he still could not have been tried
a second time for first degree murder had his appeal been unsuccessful.
Id.
206. Schiro, 114 S.Ct. at 790.
207. Id. at 793 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Schiro v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1047,
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The state subjected Schiro a second time for the intentional killing element

to "embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compell[ed] him to live in a
the
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhanc[ed]
208
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.,
In jury trials, jeopardy attaches after the jury is sworn." 9 Therefore,
the state nor the judge should be allowed to reprosecute Schiro for
"intentional" killing in the sentencing hearing, because in capital cases, the
reality is that the sentencing hearing is a second trial. Thus, the reprosecution placed the defendant twice in jeopardy for intentional murder.
B. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

The Court applied collateral estoppel principles to determine the
preclusive effect of the jury's verdict."' Thus, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel can preclude issues litigated in the guilt or innocence phase from
being relitigated in the sentencing phase."' However, the overriding issue
in Schiro was whether the issue of intent was actually litigated and resolved
in the guilt or innocence phase.2t2

dissenting)); see supra note 204
1065 (Ind.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983) (Debruler, J.,
and accompanying text (discussing the importance of substance in the double jeopardy
context).
208. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); see also United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (citing Green). The Green court stated:
The underlying idea [of the Double Jeopardy Clause], one that is deeply
ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has stated that pursuant
to this philosophy, it is well settled that under the Fifth Amendment, "averdict of acquittal
is final, ending a defendant's jeopardy, and even when 'not followed by any judgment, is a
bar to subsequent prosecution for the same offense'." Id. at 188 (stating the well-settled
principle set forth in United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896)).
209. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
210. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 790-91. If the Court found that the jury did ground its verdict
on an issue other than Schiro's intent to kill.
211. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
212. Schiro, 114 S.Ct. at 791; see infra part B(2) (discussing whether intent was
actually litigated and resolved).
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1. Supreme Court Inconsistent in Applying Collateral Estoppel Principles
The Court should not have subsequently applied collateral estoppel
principles after it held that this case involved simply a "single sentencing
hearing in course of a single prosecution. ' 21 3 Collateral estoppel is
applicable when "an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a
Under the Court's theory in Schiro,
valid and final judgment ....
there was no valid and final judgment,21 5 because unlike in Bullington, the
Schiro death penalty sentence was not imposed on remand after reversal, but
according to the Court, instead was imposed in the course of a "single
prosecution. '2 6 Therefore, the Court was inconsistent when it held that
Schiro's case constituted a single trial and then applied collateral estoppel
principles.2 17
To be consistent, the Court should not have considered collateral estoppel
as an issue after holding that this case constituted a single prosecution.
However, the Court did consider whether collateral estoppel precluded the use
of "intentional" murder as an aggravating circumstance.2 1
2. Court Applied Collateral Estoppel with a "Hypertechnical" Approach
The collateral estoppel analysis "must be set in a practical frame and

213. Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 790 (1994).
214. Id. (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443).
215. It is difficult to argue that there was a "valid and final judgment" after holding that
the case was still in the course of a "single prosecution" when the trial court used the
intentional element in the sentencing proceeding. The Court does not explain its rational for
applying collateral estoppel principles.
216. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
217. None of the United States Supreme Court cases involved the collateral estoppel
issue when there was only a single prosecution. Ashe involved a second trial on guilt or
innocence after the defendant was acquitted. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
In Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 344-45 (1990), the State in a subsequent trial
introduced evidence relating to a crime the defendant had previously been acquitted. id. at
344-45. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text. In United States v. One Assortment
of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984), the government prosecuted a defendant in a civil trial
after an acquittal of a criminal trial (allowed because of the lower burden of proof in civil
cases). Id. at 361-62. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972)
also involved a subsequent civil trial after an acquittal in the criminal trial. Id. at 235.
Collateral estoppel should have only been an issue if the Court had treated the sentencing
phase as a second trial (i.e. prosecution) separate from the guilt or innocence phase.
218. Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 790-91 (1994); see supra note 160.
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viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings., 219 It is
not to be applied with a "hypertechnical" approach, but with "realism and
rationality., 220 Otherwise, a more restrictive test would in actuality result
in a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings in at
22
least every criminal case based upon a general verdict. '
The Court has not defined a test to determine what would constitute a
"hypertechnical" approach, except to the extent that if a court takes such
approach, that would in fact result in a rejection of the rule of collateral
estoppel in criminal proceedings.222 Nevertheless, the Court arguably
applied a "hypertechnical" approach in its extensive analysis of the
223
facts.
Applying collateral principles, 224 the Court held that a rational jury
could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than Schiro's intent to
kill. 22' This reason for rejecting Schiro's collateral estoppel argument is
almost identical to the Court's reason for rejecting the defendant's collateral
estoppel argument in Dowling v. United States:226 that because there were
any number of possible reasons the jury acquitted Dowling, the defendant
failed to prove that he was not one of the intruders. 227 The first trial in
Dowling actually ended with a not guilty verdict and the Court still allowed
the testimony in a subsequent trial.228 On the other hand, the jury in
Schiro did not specifically return any verdict on the intentional killing, but
merely remained silent. 229 Thus, it is not surprising that the Court refused
to prevent the reprosecution of intentional killing under the collateral
estoppel doctrine.
Nonetheless, it appears that when a jury enters a general verdict,
collateral estoppel offers almost no protection to defendants because the
basis will be clear when only one defense was presented. 2 0 Although the
.219. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970); see supra note 81 and accompanying
text.
220. Id. at 444; see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
221. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444; see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
222. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444; see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text; see also Schiro v. Farley, 114 S.
Ct. 783, 796-98 (1994).
224. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
225. Schiro, 114 S.Ct. at 791; see supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text (stating
the Court's collateral estoppel analysis of the facts).
226. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
227. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
228. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 344 (1990); see supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
229. Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 787 (1994).
230. See Randall, supra note 63, at 301-02. Whether or not there is an acquittal or merely
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23
Court has not specifically defined "hypertechnical" approach, ' it is
arguable that if the collateral estoppel doctrine is effective only when there
is one defense, that constitutes a "hypertechnical" approach. Thus, the
Court's analysis of searching for any other basis for jury's actions constitutes a rejection of the collateral estoppel doctrine in criminal proceedings,
especially when the jury enters a general verdict.232

C. IMPLIED ACQUITAL

The Court stated, "We have in some circumstances considered jury
233
silence as tantamount to an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes.
Immediately following, it stated, "[t]he failure to return a verdict does not
have collateral estoppel effect, however, unless the record establishes that
favor. 21
the issue was actually and necessarily decided in the defendant's
The Court apparently dismissed the implied acquittal argument because of
its conclusions under the collateral estoppel analysis. 235 No case until
Schiro suggested that a court should apply collateral estoppel analysis to
determine if jury silence on a greater offense acts as an implied acquittal.
Apparently, when the case is still in the course of a "single prosecution,, 236 for the jury's silence to act as an implied acquittal of the greater
offense, thus, prevent reprosecution in the sentencing proceeding, you must
apply collateral estoppel analysis.
However, jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn. 237 And according to the implied acquittal doctrine, if the jury is dismissed without having
convicted the defendant of the greater offense, the defendant is impliedly
acquitted of the greater offense and the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes
3
In
the state from reprosecuting the defendant for the greater offense.
jury silence, requiring defendants to demonstrate the basis of why a jury acted in a certain
way makes it almost impossible to have issues precluded. Id.
231. Probably because collateral estoppel characteristically hangs on the facts of each
case. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970) (stating "the inquiry must be set in
a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings").
232. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444.
233. Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 792 (1994) (citing Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957) and Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970)).
234. Schiro, 114 S. Ct. at 792 (emphasis added).
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (describing why Schiro constituted
Although a capital case, Schiro was considered a "single
a "single prosecution").
prosecution" because there was no remand after appeal, unlike in Bullington.
237. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (describing implied acquittal
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Green, the jury convicted the defendant of the lesser offense of murder in
the second degree, but the jury was silent on the greater offense of murder
in the first degree 3 9 The Supreme Court in Green ruled that the Double
Jeopardy Clause prevents the state from reprosecuting the defendant for first
degree murder because the jury in the first trial impliedly acquitted the
defendant of that charge.2"
Schiro is strikingly similar to Green. In Schiro, the jury convicted the
defendant of the lesser offense of killing while committing the crime of
rape, but the jury was silent on the greater offense of knowingly or
intentionally killing. 24' Although in Green, the state reprosecuted the
defendant at a second guilt or innocence phase, the Court in Bullington ruled
that capital cases themselves comprise of two trials: (1) the guilt or
innocence phase; and (2) the sentencing phase.242 Therefore, because the
jury was silent on the knowingly or intentionally killing offense in the guilt
or innocence trial, the implied acquittal doctrine should have prevented the
state from reprosecuting Schiro for intentionally killing. The Court has
stated: "For whatever else [the Double Jeopardy Clause] guarantee may
embrace .... it surely protects a man who has been acquitted from having
'
to 'run the gauntlet' a second time."243
IV. PRACTICAL IMPACT
The Court's decision in Schiro that capital cases constitute only a single
prosecution, thus, allowing elements the jury refused to return a verdict on
in the guilt or innocence phase to be used by the judge as an aggravating
circumstance to sentence someone to death, will not itself cause a significant
doctrine).
239. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957). Courts continuously refer to
Green to explain implied acquittals. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text
(discussing the Green decision).
240. Green, 355 U.S. at 190-91.
241. Schiro v. Farley, 114 S.Ct. 783, 787 (1994). Although Green dealt with included
offenses, "American Courts have held with uniformity that where a defendant is charged with
two offenses, neither of which is a lesser offense included within the other, and has been
found guilty on one but not on the second he cannot be tried again on the second even
though he secures reversal of the conviction and even though the two offenses are related
offenses charged in the same indictment." Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 194 n.14
(1957) (citing Annotation, 114 A.L.R. 1406); see also Schiro, 114 S.Ct. at 795 n.3 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (quoting Green).
242. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
243. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1970) (quoting Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957)).
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impact in the sense that the decision will cause a huge increase in the
number of death penalty sentences. 2 " However, the significant impact
arises because of the extraordinary severity and irrevocability that the death
sentence generates.245 This severity and irrevocability makes the death
penalty qualitatively different from any other form of punishment. 246 This
qualitative difference of death, coupled with any increase in executions,
creates the significant impact. Although the Schiro decision enhances the
ability to sentence someone to death and thus quenches society's thirst for
retribution, it provides significant opportunities for abuse.
In this country, there are about 2800 people on death row. 7
Furthermore, there are thirty-eight jurisdictions that presently have death
penalty statutes. 8 More important to this casenote, in addition to Indiana,
both Florida and Alabama have judicial override statutes that authorizes an
elected state judge, with eyes on the next election, to sentence a defendant
to death over a jury's decision to impose a life sentence.249 When a judge
finds that aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge may justifiably override the jury's
recommendation. 2e Because Schiro enables the judge to use greater
offenses that a jury is silent on to impose the death penalty, a judge under
political pressure can manipulate the jury's silence and still impose the death
penalty.
Furthermore, the Schiro decision will result in a greater number of
death sentences. Under Schiro, it appears that a judge may impose the death
sentence using elements from the guilt or innocence phase that specifically
did not receive a "not guilty" verdict."' Thus, anything less then a "not
guilty" verdict on a murder Count leaves the defendant to "run the gauntlet"

244. See Tabak, supra note 1, at 242. There are only three states that allow a judge to
impose the death sentence, overriding a jury's decision recommending life: Florida,
Alabama, and Indiana.
245. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468-69 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting).
246. Id.
247. See Tabak, supra note 1, at 256.
248. See Tabak, supra note 1, at 241 n.8 (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, United
States Government, and United States Military).
249. See Tabak, supra note 1, at 284.
250. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
251. See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
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a second time. 2 Accordingly, with the prosecution's multiple chances to
prove elements beyond a reasonable doubt, this decision will result in an
increased number of executions. 53
The question of whether a jury did impliedly acquit or that the
prosecution is collaterally estopped from reprosecuting elements is of critical
significance, however, appellate determination is difficult and deferential.'
Had the trial court that convicted and sentenced Schiro to death
instructed the jury to elaborate upon its verdict regarding intent, the outcome
of this case possibly would have been different. 5 Defense attorneys and
judges will certainly be conscious of that, thus, will probably take appropriate measures to avoid the uncertainty in these extremely sensitive cases.

252. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
253. See Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 794 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). First,
the prosecution tried to prove knowing or intentional murder beyond a reasonable doubt in
the guilt or innocence phase. The state failed because the jury returned a guilty verdict of
felony murder, but not intentional murder. Second, the prosecution tried to prove to the jury
that Schiro intentionally killed as an aggravating circumstance. Again, the state failed
because the jury recommended life imprisonment over death. Finally, with the state's third
chance, the prosecution proved to the judge that Schiro intentionally killed as an aggravating
circumstance.
254. McAninch, supra note 17 ("Because verdicts in criminal cases are general ..
a defendant may have difficulty establishing that a particular factual issue has been resolved
in his favor by a prior decision"). See Randall, supra note 63, at 315 (discussing the
difficulties inherent in interpreting the general verdict). Although it is difficult to determine
if the state should be collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue, it is not difficult to
determine if an offense is impliedly acquitted: look to see if the jury found the defendant
guilty of the lesser offense but was silent on the greater. See supra note 97 and accompanying ext. However, the Court in Schiro apparently concluded that a jury's silence on the
greater offense acts as an implied acquittal only if the defendant can prove the issue should
be precluded under the collateral estoppel analysis. Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 792
(1994); see supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
255. See Randall, supra note 63, at 317-24. One way to protect the defendant's double
jeopardy interest and the state's concern for truth determination is to supplement an acquittal
with interrogatories that should be answered only after the jury reaches a general verdict, for
the sole purpose of determining the preclusive effect of an acquittal. Id. Ironically, in an
unconventional manner, it may be argued that an "interrogatory" was asked and answered by
the jury after its guilty verdict when the prosecution tried to persuade the jury to impose the
death sentence by attempting to prove "intent" as an aggravating circumstance and the jury
refused. However, this note argues that the jury's silence on the "intent" element at the guilt
or innocence phase should have prevented the judge from using the "intent" element in the
sentencing phase.
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V. CONCLUSION

In Schiro v. Farley, the United States Supreme Court improperly
refused to expand the principle of Bullington v. Missouri to treat death
penalty cases as two trials even though no remand from appeal. To refuse
this expansion of Bullington, the Court artificially ignored the underlying
premise of Bullington that capital cases constitute two trials and undermined
the important policy protections behind the double jeopardy clause: to
prevent the state from repeatedly subjecting defendants to "embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
the possibility that even though
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
256
innocent he may be found guilty."
The Court's decision in Schiro will have a significant impact on future
capital sentencing in states where the judge can override the'jury's
recommendation of life. Judges will be able to override the jury's
recommendation and impose a death sentence using elements in which the
jury had an opportunity to return a guilty verdict, but refused. Consequently, the judiciary's use of these elements will result in an increased number
of unjustified violations of the essence of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Also, given the public's desire for speedy retribution, do we want political
influences such as upcoming elections to affect the outcome in capital
punishment cases?2 7 Moreover,
[our] Criminal Justice [system] is designed to establish proof of
criminal guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because of a recognition
that our system contains too many uncertainties to permit a
standard of no doubt. Yet, the death penalty assumes a standard
of guilt beyond any doubt. . . . The death penalty assumes a
perfect system although the system itself recognized long ago that
perfection and therefore created
it could never meet a standard of
28
doubt.
reasonable
of
a standard
Recognizing these political influences, our systems uncertainties, and the
death penalty assumption of a perfect system, a judge looking to the next
election should not be allowed to trammel the double jeopardy protections
and sentence a defendant to death based on a factual foundation on which
the jury was silent. "History teaches [us] that grave threats to liberty often

256. See supra notes 195-208 and accompanying text.
257. See Tabak, supra note 1, at 286-87 (discussing the concerns with allowing an
elected state judge to override a jury's recommendation of life).
258. See Tabak, supra note 1, at 278.
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come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant

to endure. [W]hen we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the
name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it. "259
PATRICK

L. EDGERTON

259. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). As Justice DeBruler of the Indiana Supreme Court explained in his dissenting
opinion:
At the trial, the prosecution used every resource at its disposal to persuade
the jury that appellant had a knowing state of mind when he killed his
victim. It failed to do so. At the sentencing hearing before the jury it had
an opportunity to persuade the jury that appellant had an intentional state
of mind when he killed his victim. The jury returned a recommendation
of no death. At the sentencing hearing before the judge, the prosecution
had yet another opportunity to demonstrate an intentional state of mind, and
finally succeeded.
Schiro v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1201, 1209 (Ind.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 910 (1989); see also
Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783, 795 (1994) (quoting Justice DeBruler, dissenting) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Apparently, the motto of 'if at first you don't succeed, trial and trial again,'
reached new heights in Schiro v. Farley.

